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This paper examines the level and stmcture of executive pay across a sample of 
European economies in the mid- 1990s. Our results indicate that there are significant 
differences in executive pay across Europe which are explained in large part by the 
particular job position and Company size. However, after Controlling for these factors 
we find that country specific effects are important in executive pay determination. 
Our cross section results indicate that country effects on pay are not wholly eradicated 
by the effects of the internationalisation of capital and labour markets through factor 
price equalisation. The effects of different board structures on executive pay turns out 
to be ambiguous in our sample. 




Executive pay and corporate governance issues continue to attract wide academic, 
media and policy attention.1 The very high salaries enjoyed by senior executives in 
corporations in some economies are often contrasted with the relatively low pay 
received by executives in other economies. The case of the United States (high CEO 
pay) and Japan (low CEO pay) is an obvious example. At the same time, the stark 
differences in the corporate governance structures between such economies is often 
highlighted. For instance, the governance system in the US and UK (which stress the 
market for corporate control as a means of correcting managerial failure) is compared 
with the German and Japanese system (which stress long-term commitment). There is 
an implicit assumption that these alternative Systems of corporate control and 
governance may result in quite different economic outcomes and in particular pattems 
of executive pay. 
Despite the continued fascination with executive pay issues, as well as what 
constitutes an optimal corporate governance mechanism, there has been very little 
academic research comparing executive pay across economies. Furthermore, little has 
been attempted by way of seeing how these international pattems of executive pay 
vary according to the boardroom governance structure that particular economies have 
adopted. In part this can be attributed to the difficulties in obtaining and assembling 
the requisite data. The primary aim of this paper, then, is to present some new 
evidence on the pattern of European executive pay in the mid-1990s, one of the first 
papers to do so. Specifically, we address the following questions: 
1 For instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1985) document the effects of 
corporate Performance and scale on executive compensation. A review of recent UK 
research is found in Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995). Mayer (1996) outlines recent 
evidence underlying economic Performance and corporate governance. 
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1. Are differences in European executive pay correlated with job level/function? 
Are the returns to job level the same through-out the managerial hierarchy? 
2. Are differences in European executive pay correlated with corporate scale? 
Are the effects of Company size the same at different levels of Company size? 
3. Are differences in European executive pay correlated with country specific 
effects? If country characteristics are important in shaping executive 
compensation, are these effects similar for each country? 
4. Are differences in European executive pay determined by differences in 
corporate governance regimes. Do economies with radically different board 
structures have different levels and structures of executive pay? 
Each of the above, we argue, are consistent with alternative explanations of executive 
pay determination. Executive job level and Company size are important proxies for 
managerial talent and should clearly influence executive pay outcomes. Cross country 
Variation in pay can provide evidence the degree to which managerial labour markets 
are internationally integrated. Finally, the system of corporate governance 
(particularly board structure) may give rise to different patterns of executive pay. This 
may occur because different board structures are associated with different 
arrangements for establishing executive pay. We hope to cast some light on each of 
these issues. 
More generally, an analysis of the level and structure of European executive 
pay is warranted given the lack of existing evidence. We use pay data derived from 
expert remuneration Consultants presented at the macro level for each of ten European 
economies separately. Despite the difficulties in using macro data (specifically in 
4 
attributing causation) we believe our analysis to be useful. We can compare directly, 
using international data, the level and structure of executive compensation across a 
ränge of European economies. Accordingly, we can describe how executive pay 
levels and structure vary according to job function, corporate size, international 
integration, and basic board governance structures. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we detail the 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms in place across a variety of European 
economies. Section 3, details the potential determinants of executive pay and 
describes the European data that we use pay. In section 4 we present our results. 
Finally, in section 5 we draw together our analysis, and offer some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Corporate governance and executive pay 
2.1 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance refers to the way in which firms are directed and controlled. 
Shareholders are the ultimate owners of the firm who typically delegate decision 
making authority to a management team. The fundamental question arises: are the 
interests of the management team aligned with those of the ultimate owners? tf there 
are incentives for the interests of each group to diverge, then we have to examine 
those forces that provide potential re-alignment. This is the dornain of corporate 
governance. European economies have evolved different mechanisms to resolve these 
agency issues. In this section we wish to describe the main features of the European 
governance scene by focusing on two economies: Germany and the United Kingdom. 
2 A more complete review is provided in Charkharn (1995). 
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To fix ideas we will follow Nickell (1995) who usefully characterises two governance 
types. 
Type I. This is characterised by large, well-developed, equity markets where 
the equity in each Company is controlled by shareholders. These are institutions or 
private investors who are not closely involved with the firm. In type I economies 
hostile take-overs (mergers and acquisitions) are (relatively) easy. The market for 
corporate control disciplines the management team. 
Type II. Equity markets are organised so that substantial amount of equity in 
each Company is controlled by shareholders. These shareholders have a long-term 
commitment to t-v». Company. Hostile take-overs do not occur (friendly take-overs 
may). The market for corporate control (hostile take-over) does not function. 
Economies such as the United Kingdom and USA are examples of type I 
governance Systems, whereas Japan and Germany conform to type II Systems. Type I 
and type II economies can use different internal and external governance mechanisms 
(or some mixture) to align the interests of mangers and owners. These may promote 
long-term value maximising activity. Type I economies make extensive use of the 
threat of take-over, and the actual take-over mechanism, to persuade management to 
pursue profit maximisation (external control). Type I economies have outside or non-
executive directors who sit on the Company board who act as representatives of 
shareholders and monitor the Performance of the management team (internal control). 
Type II economies are characterised by dual boards where financial institutions have 
an important role in representing the owners interests (external control). 
In our empirical work below we are interested in examining how the level and 
structure of European pay is correlated with differences in corporate governance 
6 
Systems and board structure. Boards may influence executive pay outcomes by 
directly setting executive pay and by monitoring executive effort. However, the 
incentives for outside (non-executive) directors in Type I governance Systems to 
effectively monitor and evaluate directors may be blunted (see Nickeil, 1995, Hart, 
1995, Jensen, 1993). This may be due to lack of Information on the part of outside 
directors, lack of private rewards to the monitoring function, or indeed capture by the 
incumbent CEO who may have appointed them in the first place or control 
Information flows to them. These problems may not be so acute in Type II Systems 
which effectively divorces the management from monitoring function. In our 
empirical work, then, we simpl> aliow for international differences in executive pay 
outcomes according to type I and II Systems. 
On a practical level one has to identify the European Type I and IT economies 
in terms of their board structure. Such an exercise may be influenced by judgement. 
We have identified the Type I and II board structures according to the Korn Ferry 
(1996) method.3 Accordingly, the following 5 economies, from our European pay 
data set of 10 economies, were classified as Type II economies with two-tier board 
structures: Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Those 
economies which were classified as Type I (single board economies) are the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Belgium.4 
2.2 Executive compensation 
Both type I and type II economies are characterised by asymmetric Information 
3 Despite the difficulties in always allocating specific countries to particular governance 
Systems, we sue the classicication outlined by Korn Ferry. The data referes to 1995. 
4 Korn-Ferry classify Belgium as a mixed System country. 
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between owners (or their representatives) and the management team. Agency modeis 
predict that incentive contracts of various kinds (relating pay to observed measures of 
Performance) will be observed in such situations. The owners of the firm have 
incomplete Information about the Performance (or effort) of the management team. 
They are concerned with maximising the long-term prospects (value) of the enterprise. 
This is an increasing function of the effort expended by management, but is also 
affected by random shocks (which may be aggregate, firm or industry specific). Both 
effort and the shock are not observable ex ante (the Performance function is non-
separable in its arguments) but Performance is observable (or may be approximated) 
ex post. It is usual to suppose that management is both risk and effort averse and 
holds an outside job opportunity. The optimal (linear) contract will tie some 
Proportion of management pay to observed profit. Consider 2 contracts. Under 
contract 1 the firm pays the manager a fixed wage and receives the residual income. 
Here the incentive for effort is minimal as pay is not related to outcomes. Under 
contract 2 the firm receives a fixed income (dividend) and the manager receives the 
residual income (profit). Incentive to management effort is very large (and so is risk 
and compensation). The second-best (share-cropping) contract is the intermediate 
case where some income depends on Performance. 
Much of the academic research on executive pay focuses on United States 
data. The high pay received by executives at US leading companies is sometimes 
contrasted with the salaries received by directors in Japanese companies & elsewhere 
(see Kaplan, 1994, Crystal, 1992). In comparison to the voluminous US literature, 
there are relatively few European studies. Of those that do exist most are single 
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country studies and do not explicitly compare executive pay across Europe5. The two 
variables that characterise these type of regression analyses are corporate Performance 
and Company size. Empirically, the most important predictor of executive pay is 
Company size reflecting the returns to managerial talent in large companies (see 
Rosen, 1992). Company Performance variables (either market or accounts based) 
appear to play less of a role in shaping executive pay (see Conyon et al, 1995). 
In our empirical work we have available two measures that may proxy 
managerial talent. First, is job position. We are able to identify executive pay for one 
of 5 job levels ranging from CEO to middle manager. Economic theory (e.g. 
tou* idinent modeis6) would suggest that the pay is positively related to job level. 
Second, we can identify the pay of an executive in one of six size class bands. So, in 
common with micro-econometric work on the determination of pay we can examine 
the returns to Company scale. We provide such for a ränge of European economies in 
1996. 
3. European differences in executive compensation 
Assembling data on executive pay across European countries is difficult (see Abowd 
and Bognanno, 1993). Different country governance structures (type I and IT), legal 
and accounting Systems and alternative ways of measuring executive compensation 
complicates the data assembly exercise. Usually, there are no unifying datasets which 
allow cross-country comparisons possible 
5 For instance, some recent European studies of executive pay determination include: Conyon 
(1997), Cosh and Hughes (1997), Main, Bruce "and Bück (1996)- United Kingdom. 
Schwalbach and Grassoff (1997), Grasshof and Schwalbach (1997) - Germany, Angel and 
Fumas (1997) - Spam. Eriksson (1997) and Eriksson and Lausten (1997) - Denmark. 
Alcouffe (1997) - Franc; Branello, Graziano and Parigi (1996) - Italy, 
6 See Lazear & Rosen (1981), Lazear(1986, 1995) 
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However, in this paper we use as our primary data source Information on 
executive cornpensation by the European Independents Remuneration Network (EI-
RN) supplied by P-E International to provide evidence on the cross -national level and 
growth in European pay. The data refers to the period 1996. There are 10 countries 
included in the review (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Klingdom). The data collection 
methodology involves survey data assembled by prestigious cornpensation Consulting 
companies throughout Europe. In total there are 2,846 companies represented across 
the 10 economies accounting for 30,288 incumbents.7 The EI-RN survey represents 
one of the largest and mcst extensive reports of its kind in Europe. Because of the 
way that executive pay is defined in this data set (i.e. it is essentially total cash 
cornpensation - see below) we also Supplement this pay data source with data from a 
Towers Perrin survey.8 This allows us to construct a richer pay variable which 
includes, for instance, the value of long term incentive plans (see below). Our 
analysis also seeks to explain whether there are systematic differences in executive 
pay according to types of board structure. In particular, we wish to identify those 
European economies which have so called two tier board structures (see above). 
Before formally stating the hypotheses, we describe in more detail our primary 
data source. The Remuneration in Europe data (P-E International) contains 
Information on total cash cornpensation and bonus for executives in each country. 
The pay Information can be collected for Job levels and corporate size. We define our 
first pay measure (PAY1) as Total Cash / Remuneration is defined as Base Salary + 
7 The distribution of companies across Europe is given in the appendix. 
8 We thank Clara Graziano for helping to get access to the survey. 
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Variable Cash9. Base Salary means the annual contractual salary (EI-RN page 6). 
Variable Cash includes bonuses (Performance and / or rnerit), commissions, profit-
share or other non-guaranteed payments (EI-RN page 7). Total Cash / Remuneration 
excludes the estimated value of stock options and other equity held by directors (this 
may be more appropriate for some than other economies - see Abowd and Bognanno, 
1993 and our Supplement data below). The data for each of the countries is 
transformed to a common unit using the currency conversion rates supplied by 
Remuneration in Europe. The descriptive data below is reported in D-Marks, Sterling 
andEcus. 
There are 5 job levels. Job lc-J I is defined as the most senior füll time 
executive of the Company10. Job level 2 is usually a director of the Company11. Job 
level 3 is the Head of a major department who is not a director. This person may be 
referred to as a senior manager1". Job level 4 is a senior manager responsible for 
establishing new methods of implementing a defined strategy and plans within a given 
discipline. Finally, Job level 5 is a middle manager of the Company concerned 
(typically reporting to levels 3 / 4). 
Our data set also contains pay information by employee size bands (of which 
there are a maximum of six bands).13 The size bands are defined as: Band 1, 1-99 
employees; Band 2, 100-249 employees; Band 3, 250-499 employees; Band 4, 500-
9 PAY2 and PAY3 use data from Towers Perrin and are described below. 
10 The individual is responsible for defining strategy, in agreement with the stated policy of 
the board and or shareholders. He / she can make suggestions to the board regarding the 
adoption of policy. He / she is responsible for the profit / loss of the Organisation and the 
cornpany's overall management; he she reports to the board shareholders. 
11 The individual will usually sit on the board or at least the executive committee of the 
Organisation. He she is responsible for developing strategy and planning within the business 
unit function. He / she reports to Job Level 1. 
12 The individual is responsible for planning and impleraentation of strategy within a 
department and usually reports to levels 2. 
13 Employees are defined as the number of full-time equivalent employees at the Company. 
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999 employees; Band 5, 1000-4999 employees; and Band 6, 5,000 plus employees. 
Each country pro vi des data in four to six size bands depending on the most 
appropriate end point to produce valid data, (see EI-RN page 6). 
Conceptually, then, our estimated pay equations which follow can contain 300 
data points (i.e. 5 x 6 x 1 0 ) . However, in practice the actual number is less. Some 
countries have fewer size band data (e.g. Austria) and in some of the regressions 
reported below we can only focus on CEOs (rather than the füll compliment of 
executives). This latter issue arises when we are matching in CEO only data from 
Towers Perrin. 
The supplementary Towers Perrin data set contains a much richer specification 
of the pay variable which we are keen to exploit. The data is available for CEOs in 
1995 only. In addition, three of our economies were excluded due to lack of data 
(Austria, Denmark & Ireland). We define our second pay measure (PAY2) as Total 
Cash Compensation plus compulsory and voluntary contributions, perquisites and the 
value of long term incentives. Compulsory contributions include employer 
contributions and expenses for social security, compulsory benefits and termination 
indemnities. Voluntary contributions are employer contributions for private 
retirement, life insurance programs medical and other employee benefit plans. 
Perquisites include the annual cash value of cars, club memberships and other sundry 
perquisites. Finally, the value of long term incentives is usually the value of executive 
stock options. The value of PAY2 was arrived at in local currency and deflated by the 
exchange rate given by EI-RN. 
The final pay measure (PAY3) tries to make an allowance for differentials in 
European personal rates of income taxation. That is we examine the after tax value of 
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pay. This measure aims to focus more on the purchasing power of income, rather than 
the pre-tax cost to the employer. To this end we calculate PAY3 simply as (1-tax rate) 
x PAY2. The tax rates that we use are drawn from Abowd and Bognanno (1993) and 
are presented in Appendix table A2. 
Using the Information contained in our main data set we can model executive 
pay as: 
Yijk = w + 0Ci + ßj + 6k + £ijk (1) 
where y is the log of pay in job level i in Company size band j in country k. The pay 
measures that we use are PAY1 to PA Y3. The term (Xi is the contribution of the job 
level in explaining the cross section Variation in y, ßj are the contribution of corporate 
scale to the Variation on y and 8k is the contribution of country specific effects (see 
below). £ijk and w are the equation error and an arbitrary constant. Since oti, ßj, and 6k 
are indicator variables, identification requires that one variable be excluded in 
estimation. We choose the lowest size class band and job level. Arbitrarily, we 
choose Austria as the excluded country. All other dummy variables are relative to 
these. 
Equation 1 is not amenable to structural or causal Interpretation (see 
Schamlensee, 1985). However, as a reduced form model we can test some important 
Statistical restrictions. We test that job level or position has no effect on the level of 
pay ((Xi = 0). In addition, we can test whether the effects of job level are identical oci = 
... = (X4 . We would expect that CEOs earn more than middle managers. Similarly, we 
can test the importance of Company size in the pay regression (i.e. ßj = 0). The null is 
that pay outcomes are not related to the size of the Company. Furthermore, we can test 
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whether the size effect is the same within each employee band. ß2 = ... = ß6 (where 6 
is large Company and 2 is a small Company). 
Finally, we introduce a role for country specific effects. Increased European 
Integration and the effects of factor price equalisation would tend to predict that 
executive compensation should be equal for individuals with similar abilities and 
characteristics. If this process was complete, then after Controlling for individual 
factors the country specific effects should be negligible. So, 6k = 0 implies that pay 
outcomes are independent of country specific factors. If valid, this suggests that pay 
outcomes do not depend on country factors but instead purely on other factors (e.g. 
human capital, job position, Company effects). However, if country effects are 
important we can test whether executive pay responds the same way in all countries. 
We test the restriction that 8k are identicaL That is there are no differences in the 
country effect on executive pay. 
We are also interested in the impact of board structure on executive pay. 
Having classified the European economies into governance types I and n we define an 
indicator variable (Board) set equal to one if the economy is type II and zero 
otherwise. Since Board and the economy-wide dummies are lineaiiy dependent 
identification requires the exclusion of the country effects. Accordingly, we estimate: 
yyk = w + Od + ßj + ?JBoardk + eijk (2) 
where X is the (cross section) proportional effect of a Type II board system on the 
level of executive pay.14 
14 We note that it will pick up all country characteristics that are common to the countries 
going to make up the composite variable Board. This is an inevitable consequence of not 
having within country Variation on board characteristics. However, Conyon and Schwalbach 
(1997) use detailed micro data on German and UK companies to overcome these problems. 
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4. Results 
Basic descriptive statistics are contained in Table 1 and are expressed in 1996 ECU's, 
D-Marks and pounds Sterling. The data refer to CEO total cash compensation from 
our primary data set. Table la considers those CEOs at large cornpanies (i.e. those 
CEOs in the largest employee size band) and Table 2 contains the mean of CEO pay 
across the six employee size bands. The most striking feature to note about the data is 
the considerable heterogeneity across countries in terms of the cash compensation 
received by CEOs. CEO pay in large cornpanies in Germany is 421916 Ecus, and in 
the UK its is 281862 Ecus. Ireland has the lowest pay for CEOs at 104469 Ecus. This 
pattern is also more readily seen in Figure 1 which plots CEO compensation (in 
pounds Sterling). In addition, the distribution of European executive pay is not just an 
artefact of the returns to large cornpanies. The heterogeneity in executive pay is 
largely unaltered when one considers CEO pay across all size bands (Table lb). 
These differences in CEO pay, however, are not wholly attributed to the 
different structure of European executive compensation. Although there are 
differences in the structure of CEO compensation this does not result in a complete 
harmonisation of CEO pay levels across Europe. Indeed, the Standard deviation of 
CEO pay excluding non-cash remuneration (PAY1) is 76,336.32. The Standard 
deviation for the wider pay measure including such non-cash benefits (PAY2) was 
84,632.64. So, Controlling for these wider payment attributes increases (rather than 
decreases) the Variation in our executive compensation measure across the European 
economies. 
Table 2 documents the differences in structural characteristics of CEO pay 
using the supplementary data from Towers Perrin. In column 1 we compute the total 
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non-cash remuneration as a percentage of total cash remuneration. Recall that total 
non-cash remuneration is simply the sum of cornpulsory contributions, voluntary 
contributions, perquisites and the value of long term incentives. The average across 
the available 7 countries is approximately 41%. There is Variation though. Germany 
has the lowest ratio (25%) and the United Kingdom the highest (67%). Together, this 
tends to harmonise the value of total compensation of these two countries as can be 
seen by inspecting Figures 2 & 3. However, as these figures also show (and noted 
above) there remain other significant differences in European CEO compensation. 
The decomposition of non-cash remuneration into their separate elements is 
also of some interest. The value of long term incentives as a percentage of total cash 
remuneration is highest in the UK.15 Indeed, in this sample of economies the UK is 
by the far most extensive user of long term incentives as a way of rewarding CEOs. 
The practice is not used to any extent in other European economies. 
The econometric results are contained in Table 3. This examines the 
relationship between executive pay, job level, Company size and board strueture. 
Dealing with the job level variables we find that there is a strong positive effect on 
CEO pay. In all regressions (in columns 1-4) the estimated impact of the job level 
increases monotonically as one moves to higher corporate positions. The result is not 
sensitive to the inclusion of size, country or board effects. The retum to being the 
CEO (job level 1) relative to middle managers (job level 5) is 132%? (column 3). 
Similarly, there is a strong positive correlation between Company size and 
executive pay as evidenced by the increasing magnitude of the coefficient estimates as 
one moves from employee band 2 up to the largest employee band 6. The result is 
15 Long-term incentives can be thought of as the value of stock options or other instruments 
that count as part of executive wealth (for instance phantorn Option schemes) 
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obtained after Controlling for job position and country specific effects (column 3). 
The picture that emerges, then, is that executives are rewarded for corporate scale (i.e. 
large companies pay more). This is consistent with most micro research on executive 
compensation which reveals that the pay elasticity with respect to Company size is in 
the ränge 0.2 to 0.35. Also, our data revealed that more talented individuals (who 
achieve the top job slot) are also more highly rewarded. 
In column 4 we replace the country effects with basic board structure effect. 
This indicator variable of a Type II (2 tier) board System attracts a positive and 
significant coefficient. The implication is that countries with a 2-tier board System 
have higher levels of total CEO cash compensation than Single board countries. Our 
prior expectation was that 2-tier boards may have exercised a stronger monitoring 
function which may have been associated with lower pay.16 Before we investigate the 
robustness of this finding to alternative pay measures we consider various restrictions 
placed on our basic pay equation. 
Table 4 details the results of various restrictions on our pay equations. 
Column 1 provides a test that the Joint impact of each pay determinant is "—o. In 
column 2 we test whether the effects of the pay determinant are the same. In uo final 
column we present the R2 from a regression of executive pay on that determinant of 
pay only. The row by row results are easy to summarise.17 The effect of job levels in 
explaining executive pay is highly significant. A test that the effects are jointly zero is 
easily rejected (F=344.55). Moreover, these effects are not identical throughout the 
16 Of course, this relies on us assuming that the supervisory board is simply putting a halt to 
management entrenchment. It may well be the case that supervisory board Systems realising 
the superior management talent of their executives may pay them more. 
17 We report the results based on the measure which is simply total cash compensation. The 
use of wider pay measures did not alter the qualitative results on the size and country effects 
reported below. 
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corporate hierarchy (F=306.58). Indeed, this confirms our earlier finding that CEOs 
are paid significantly more than other levels (e.g. directors) in the Corporation. Such a 
finding is consistent with tournament theories of compensation determination which 
stress that high pay in the CEO position is needed to motivate executives at lower 
levels in the Company Organisation. The effects of job level alone explains 61% of the 
Variation in executive pay. This is an important finding. Managerial talent and the 
position one h.olds within a Company seems to be a very important factor in shaping 
Company pay outcomes. 
In row 2 the effects of Company scale are examined. Again, the results 
indicate that the combmed effect of the Company size factors on pay cannot be 
rejected (F=24.57). In addition, the effects of each size band are not equal (F=29.47). 
Finally, the effect of Company size alone (excluding job position and country 
differences) explains 12.24% of the Variation in executive pay. 
In row 3 we focus on the country effects. Clearly, there are important 
international differences in explaining European pay outcomes. A test that the 
country effects are jointly equal to zero is rejected (F=56.71). Moreover, given that 
there are such effects, our results indicate that these are not identical in each country. 
Indeed, a formal test that the country effects on executive pay are identical is rejected 
(F=63.66). Together, these results imply that despite the internationalisation of 
product, capital and labour markets there are still marked national differences which 
explain executive pay awards across Europe. 
Table 5 explores the effect of board type on executive pay further. These 
regressions do not cater for job effects due to data limitations. First, we should note 
that regardless of pay measure, the effect of size on executive pay remains strongly 
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positive as before. In colurnn 1 we report the board effect on total CEO cash 
remuneration. The effect is positive and significant. In colurnn 2 we regress total real 
compensation (PAY2) on Company size and board type. Now the effect has become 
insignificant. We suspect that this result comes about because of the harmonisation 
between pay rates (particularly Germany and the UK) that occurs when one moves 
from a cash compensation to a total compensation measure which includes estimates 
of the value of non-cash components of executive pay. The same conclusion is 
arrived at when one makes an attempt to control for tax effects (using PAY3) 
measure. The result here is negative now, but not significant at conventional levels. 
Overall, we must conclude that countries with two-tier style board structures have an 
ambiguous relationship with CEO pay. The result, using this macro data, will depend 
on the type of adjustments that have been made to compensation. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined differences in executive pay across a sample of 10 European 
economies. The research was motivated by the paucity of cross-country evidence on 
the level and structure of executive pay. To aid our analysis we have used a unique 
data set which has Information on executive pay, classified by job level, Company size 
and country. Our international comparison of executive pay has used macro data 
assembled for each country by remuneration specialists. Micro-data on individual 
firms across these economies simply was not available. 
Our main results indicated that there are many complex drivers of European 
executive pay. Not least are the positive influences of managerial talent which we 
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proxied by job position and corporate size. Our results indicated that both job level 
and Company size were important Statistical, determinants of European pay. Indeed, 
together these variables explained much of the Variation in executive pay. 
We examined whether increased European integration and the effects of factor 
price equalisation resulted in executive compensation that was more equal for 
individuals with similar abilities and characteristics. If such a process was complete, 
then after Controlling for individual factors the country specific effects should be 
negligible. Our results, though, indicated a significant role for country effects in 
shaping executive pay. Factor price equalisation has not yet resulted in similar 
executive pay outcomes across Europe for individuals working in a given job level, 
with similar talents, or in the same size Company. 
We also exploited the level and structure of pay according to the govemance 
System in Operation. Having classified the European economies into govemance types 
I and H we found that the effect of boards on executive pay was ambiguous. 
Economies with type II board structures had higher total cash compensation for 
executives. However, once the effect of other components of compensation had been 
accounted for then the correlation between board type and CEO pay was not 
significant. We found that the board effect depended on how the executive 
compensation variable was defined. 
Finally, our analysis contributes to the wider debate about executive pay in 
Europe and the govemance mechanisms that shape it. Our analysis here has taken 
place using essentially macro data. Accordingly, we have provided a broad picture of 
the European scene. We are, however, acutely aware that such data are prone to many 
methodological problems that, in the context of this paper, cannot be addressed. An 
20 
immediate problem to Square up to is the role of individual firms in setting pay. A 
worthy future project would take individual Company level data from a set of 
European economies and then test what factors are most important in explaining 
executive pay. This would have the very real advantage of being able to discriminate 
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Tot ! (average) 243455.23 458028.32 19885.9.75 
Source: Remuneration in Europe (1996) 




















































Source; Remuneration in Europe (1996) 
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Source: Towers Perrin (1995) 
1. Total cash remuneration is the sum of compulsory and voluntary contributions, 
perquisites and the value of long-term benefits. 
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Table 3: Executive pay, job level, Company size and coimtry ef'fects 
Job level 1 
Job level 2 
Job level 3 
Job level 4 
Employee band 2 
Employee band 3 
Employee band 4 
Employee band 5 





























































































Observations 236 236 236 236 
R2 0.6106 0.7225 0.8621 0.7847 
1. Dependent variable is (log) total cash compensation (PAY1) 
2. White (1980) adjusted Standard errors reported below coefficient estimates 
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Table 4: Statistical restrictions 
Test the effect is Test the effect are R~ contribution of 
jointly zero the identical the effect on pay 
Job level effect OCJ = 0 ai = ... = a4 0.6106 
F(4,217) = 344.55 F(3,217) = 306.58 
Company scale ßj = 0 ß2 = ... = ß6 0.1224 
effect F(5,217) = 24.57 F(4,217) = 29.47 
Country effects 8k = 0 52 = ... = 5io 0.2329 
F(9,217) = 56.71 F(8,217)= 6_3.66 
Tests in columns 2 & 3 refer to the estimated model: 
Yijk = w + a, + ßj + 5k + eijk 
where y is (log) total cash compensation (PAY1) 
In column 3 the R2 are from a regression of y on ai, ßj, 8k separately. 
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Table 5: CEO pay regressions (alternative measures) on Job level and board type 
Employee band 2 
Employee band 3 
Employee band 4 
Employee band 5 

























































1. Regression of different chief executive pay measures on employee band size and 
board type. 
2. White (1980) adjusted Standard errors reported below coefficient estimates 
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Appendix 

























Source: Remuneration in Europe. Supplied by the European Independents 
Remuneration Network (1997). The data refers to 1996. 

































1. Governance types: Korn Ferry International. 
2. Personal income tax: Abowd and Bognanno (1993) table 2.6 page 91. 
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